The revelation late on 24 September 2009 that Iran is in the process of building a second uranium-enrichment plant inside a mountain near the holy city of Qom introduces a fresh source of dispute to a longstanding contest of wills between the Tehran regime and western states. The information – supplied by Iran itself to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 21 September, after it emerged that western intelligence sources had become aware of the project – is not in itself evidence that Iran has an active nuclear-weapon programme; but it most certainly does mean that Iran will have that option at a time of its choosing.

The varying parts of the differentiated Iranian leadership have been consistent in denying that their state intends to acquire a nuclear-weapon capacity, though they also affirm – and foreign governments and international agencies agree – that Iran has the right to develop civil nuclear technologies. The information about the second installation both heightens the ambiguity that has always surrounded this issue, and creates a new source of tension.

Iran responded to the moment on 27-28 September by test-firing short- and long-range missiles on successive days (the latter the liquid-fuel Shahab-3 and the solid-fuel Sajil, each with a range of up to 1,987 kilometres). This forms a tense backdrop to the already scheduled meeting in Geneva on 1 October 2009, part of the ongoing cycle of diplomatic discussion among the “five-plus-one” group (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany – plus Iran).

The context

The strategic and economic relevance of nuclear power for an oil-and-gas-rich state such as Iran has been endlessly disputed. There is a strong and longstanding belief in Iran that the possession of a thriving nuclear-energy sector forms one of the attributes of modernity, a sentiment arguably reinforced by western nuclear lobbies’ powerful advocacy of this energy source as a big part of the response to climate change.

The development of a nuclear-weapons capacity carries the civil-nuclear argument into another realm, but for many Iranian politicians there are pressing security reasons to take this course, even if their public stance (including that of the president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) is to disclaim any interest in a military nuclear capacity.

The most immediate argument is the perceived need to counter Israel, a nuclear-weapons state since the late 1960s that now has a substantial arsenal. This extends to a sense of Iran existing alongside (if not indeed being encircled by) other nuclear-weapons states in the region – Pakistan and India to the east, and Russia to the north. Many western analysts pay little attention to such concerns, as indeed to Iranian perceptions of the massive United States presence in the vicinity of Iran, but this is all the more reason for registering their existence.

Indeed, it is hard to understand the tortuous arguments over Iran’s nuclear plans over the past decade without taking the view from Tehran centrally into account. In this respect, President Bush’s state-of-the-union address in January 2002 – which identified Iran as a core member of the “axis of evil” alongside Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea – was hugely significant. This speech, after all, was delivered while Iran was still ruled by the relatively moderate Mohammad Khatami, whose government had – just two months earlier, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks – aided the United States in terminating the Taliban regime across Iran’s eastern border in Afghanistan.

The George W Bush administration went on to demolish an even more bitter adversary of Iran,  the Ba’athist regime across Iran’s western border, in 2003; but the accompanying rhetoric and the underlying dynamic meant that this also was perceived in Iran as threatening. Iran attempted to address this new situation by offering a “grand bargain” with Washington in spring 2003, but this was rejected. Iran’s elite came to see the US leadership as representing a “clear and present danger”, which may have been one factor in the election of the hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Khatami’s successor in June 2005.

It is true that the outcomes of US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq were in some ways helpful to Iran: the despised Taliban were driven back, Tehran was handed greater influence in Iraq, Barack Obama is clearly different to George W Bush. But the Iranian leadership – armed with a perspective that is rooted (as authors such as Fred Halliday emphasise) in 3,000 years of continuous statehood – also understands that Obama may continue in office only until January 2013, and could well be replaced by a new president every bit as hawkish as Bush.

The calculations

At present, however, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his cohort do have a problem: that Barack Obama is not functioning sufficiently as the embodiment of the “evil empire”. This fact is strikingly confirmed in the United States administration’s reaction to the news of 24 September 2009; for it is becoming clear that Obama has effectively ruled out a military option and is sticking forcefully to diplomatic engagement. If Iran does not so engage, then US policy will be to isolate Iran through even more stringent sanctions, anticipating that even Russia will come at least part of the way (see Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Aims To Isolate Iran if Talks Fail“, Washington Post, 29 September 2009).

True, China may present difficulties here, given its close relationship with Tehran over oil-and-gas deals as well as armaments supplies (see Michael Wines, “China‘s Ties With Iran Complicate Diplomacy“, New York Times, 30 September 2009). But even without China’s aid, a United States-led coalition could significantly increase the damage to Iran’s already shaky economy.

In a broader frame, the foreign-policy approach of the Obama administration poses serious difficulties to Ahmadinejad, who badly needs an external enemy to divert attention from the failing economy and the deep political divisions inside Iran (see Nazenin Ansari, “Iran’s unfinished crisis“, 16 September 2009). In the absence of such an enemy, and with the United States highly unlikely to take the war option, the obvious and logical option is to use every opportunity to identify Israel as the core threat.

This motive is matched and even exceeded on the other side: for both the rightwing government of Binyamin Netanyahu and a wider, deep-seated and cross-party view in Israel hold that Iran simply cannot under any circumstances be allowed to become a nuclear-weapons power. This combination of circumstances makes it more than likely that the period following the Geneva meeting on 1 October 2009 will be characterised by Iran’s further diplomatic stalling and high-pitched anti-Israel rhetoric, and Israel’s own repeated warnings about the imminent nuclear danger from Tehran.

This means that Obama will have the tough job of persuading the Israelis not to take military action against Iran on their own account. He will persist in this, both out of conviction and from underlying concern over the probable results of any Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. These were explored in an Oxford Research Group briefing  – Iran: Consequences of a War (February 2006) – which at the time of publication and after was widely read, in Tehran as well as in Washington. The document is still pertinent.

In military terms, Israel has the capacity to inflict serious damage on most of Iran’s current nuclear facilities, principally by using its recently acquired long-range F-15I and F-16I strike-aircraft as well as its ballistic and cruise missiles. It might even be able to conduct an operation without overflying Iraqi territory – if Jordan and Saudi Arabia, whose leaders have their own concerns about Iran, give such permission; but in any case, it is unlikely that any attack would do more than set Iran’s nuclear ambitions back by two or three years.

The consequences

In the short term, and especially from an Israeli perspective, there would be value in accomplishing even this: for it could be seen as sending the necessary message that Iran will not be permitted to take the nuclear-weapons path, either now or in the future.

At the same time, this assessment could be deeply mistaken in that it underestimates greatly the immediate consequences an attack on Iran is almost guaranteed to provoke:

* It unites much of Iranian political opinion behind Ahmadinejad and his intransigent allies – at least for some months. He may be disliked in many circles and hated in some, but if the country is under attack this will transcend political differences

* Iran formally withdraws from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This will disallow any future inspections, and allow the country to rebuild its bomb-damaged facilities and move as rapidly as possible to develop a nuclear-weapons capability. This alone means that more attacks from Israel will be necessary – leading to a long-term state of war

Iran also has other options, although it may chose to wait for months or even years to utilise them:

* Engineer a series of crises over transit through the Straits of Hormuz, not sufficient to demand an out-and-out response from the United States fifth-fleet but more than enough to send shock-waves through the oil markets. Such a process could be sustained for many months

* Increase engagement with the Shi’a majority in Iraq, to the extent of encouraging more forceful opposition to any continuing US presence in the country

* Provoke more difficulties for the US-led coalition in western Afghanistan, less by aiding Taliban elements than by expanding Iranian influence from Herat eastwards and undermining central governance in Kabul

* Aid the Hizbollah movement in Lebanon even more overtly in its confrontation with Israel.

If any of these actions and strategic choices were in turn to lead to a forceful US response -  perhaps around 2013-14, after the end of the Barack Obama presidency – then Iran has more extreme options in its armoury: including the paramilitary targeting of oil-and-gas production and transport facilities in western Gulf states.

The predicament

It is relevant to these prognoses that most Arab elites would quietly welcome an Israeli strike on Iran, but that Arab public opinion would be bitterly opposed. The absence of any real political progress in achieving a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a key factor here. An additional relevant factor is that while Iraq is the only major Arab state with a Shi’a majority, there are substantial Shi’a communities in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. There is particular concern in security circles in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that Shi’a minorities would react with great anger to an Israeli attack on Iran.

All these issues have been analysed in great depth in Washington policy-circles. The Barack Obama administration is facing a difficult position as a new period of negotiations with and about  Iran gets underway (see Godfrey Hodgson, “Barack Obama’s great test“, 30 September 2009). Some of the wilder voices on the American right argue even now for military action against Iran. But this constant domestic refrain pales against a far greater external challenge: from elements in Tehran that actively want confrontation, and from an Israeli government that could be all too ready to oblige.

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. Paul Rogers’s books include Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007) – an analysis of the strategic misjudgments of the post-9/11 era and why a new security paradigm is needed. A third edition of his Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 2009) is forthcoming.  He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26 September 2001.

When Hillary Clinton suggested recently that, were she president, an attack on Israel by Iran would result in the “total obliteration” of Iran, some recent visitors to that country cringed. As they did when President George W. Bush likened talking to Iran or Hamas with “appeasement.” Lynda Howland, Tom Moore and Judy Bello have all visited Iran within the last year — Howland, in March — under the auspices of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, one of the country’s oldest peace groups. “A lot of the American public sees Iran as primitive, terrorist and uncivilized,” says Howland, of Pittsford. But that’s not what visitors find in Iran, she says. Iranians are increasingly well-educated, respectful and eager to speak to Americans, she says. She showed me a photo of some soldiers smiling and flashing a peace sign when they learned the group in front of them were Americans.

Everyone knows that the United States would respond with force to any attack on Israel, and will do what it can to prevent Iran from aiding Iraqis who are trying to kill American troops. That doesn’t mean dialogue with Iran serves no purpose. Howland cites Iranian human rights activist Shirin Ebadi, the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize winner, who says, “Dialogue has to take place at three levels: at the level of people and civil society, among members of parliament of both countries, and by heads of government of both countries.” People-to-people conversation is part of the process of building (or rebuilding) bridges.

“There’s no way anyone in Iran wants to go to war with anyone,” says Bello, a computer programmer from Webster, who visited the country in December. Meeting with ordinary Iranians in the streets and shops of Tehran does not provide instant insight into what the government may do. But I do believe there is value in these people-to-people missions. They can help Americans understand that there is more to Iran than President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The country is modern, with a growing professional class, including women. There is a blend of religious and secular culture. There is a deep appreciation for art, which is everywhere in public. “And they revere poets, not movie stars,” Bello says.

Indeed, says Howland, on any day, you can see Iranians visiting the tomb of Hafez, a legendary 14th-century Persian poet. “People gather every night,” she says, “and they read poetry and place flowers on the grave.” It is difficult to listen to people speak from the heart, to eat with them, to visit their homes, to hear them express their hopes for their children — and still see them as enemies. That’s what people-to-people missions are all about. Moore recalls a brief encounter with a man, perhaps a bit older than he, who could not speak English, although he tried to communicate with gestures. “I could see in his face that he wanted to reach out,” Moore says. “I tried to gesture that I understood.” It was a simple human exchange.

Similarly, Howland says, at the end of her visit, a few women went into a carpet shop and wanted to make purchases. “But we couldn’t use our credit cards because of the (U.S.) trade embargo. So he told us he has relatives in New Jersey and we could send the money to them. We left with $500 worth of rugs.” It was a simple expression of trust. It is a side to Iran few Americans have seen, but all – including our leaders – should be aware of.

With the Bush administration angling for war with Iran, the city of Chicago is considering going on record opposing it

Michael Lynn

May 9, 2008

More than 7,000 miles separate Chicago and Tehran. But on May 14, the city council of the American city will consider whether to take a stand on an event that would have far reaching consequences for residents of both: a US attack on Iran.

A resolution introduced into the council by one of its members, Alderman Joe Moore, would put the city on record as opposing a preemptive strike against Iran by the US. The resolution urges all congressional representatives whose districts include parts of the city to “clearly express the will of the people of Chicago in opposing any attack on Iran, and urging the Bush administration to pursue diplomatic engagement with that nation.”

The resolution is the result of an initiative launched by Chicago’s No War On Iran Coalition, a broad-based grouping of local anti-war, social justice and faith organisations. Ranging widely in viewpoints, the goal that unites us all is preventing the United States from launching another elective war that we believe would prove even more disastrous than the five-year-old one next door in Iraq.

Recent events have added urgency to the goal. In April, General David Petraeus, the commanding officer of American forces in Iraq, and Ryan Crocker, US ambassador to that country, testified to several congressional committees. In their testimony, both struck a common theme: the role of Iran in promoting insurgent attacks in Iraq. Both men accused so-called “special groups” of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards of being responsible for the deaths of American troops and rocket strikes on the Green Zone.

That testimony flies in the face of the opinion of the American intelligence community, expressed in a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (pdf) that Iran “is not likely to be a major driver of violence” in Iraq. It nevertheless allowed the Bush administration to assign blame for the Iraq debacle to Iran and provide the rationale for military action if they so chose. The president issued a thinly veiled threat in insisting that Iran cease supplying weapons in Iraq or “America will act to protect our interests, and our troops.”

Signs of war go beyond rhetoric. April also saw the forced resignation of Admiral William Fallon as chief of Central Command, responsible for Pentagon operations in the Middle East. Fallon had been quoted a month earlier in an Esquire article as being opposed to attacking Iran. His replacement will be Bush’s favourite general – Petraeus, whose congressional testimony so carefully mirrored Bush administration talking points.

No War on Iran Coalition members are prepared to answer those who suggest that local government bodies have no business involving themselves in matters of foreign policy. We point to the enormous burden the Iraq occupation has placed on the city, in terms of lives disrupted and what economists refer to as ‘opportunity costs.’

The occupation has cost the citizens of Chicago roughly $5.5bn (and counting). That translates to $105m for each of the city’s 50 Wards (districts), each represented by a member of the city council. Those funds could have bought 112,543 public safety officers for one year; 365 elementary schools; 39,567 units of affordable housing; 84,067 elementary school teachers for one year; and so on.

And if you think the costs of the occupation are horrendous, the costs associated with an attack on Iran, both in terms of lives and dollars, would be much worse.

Support for the resolution comes from diverse ideological quarters, as a glance at those testifying in support attests. Scott Ritter, a 12 year veteran of US Marine intelligence and former UN chief weapons inspector in Iraq; John Mearsheimer, a realist international relations expert from the University of Chicago who voted for Bush in 2000; veteran New York Times foreign correspondent (and CiF contributor) Stephen Kinzer. They represent the breadth of opposition to further military adventurism in an unstable part of the globe.

No one harbours any illusions that the resolution will stop a US attack on Iran. Rather, the measure is seen as a vehicle to raise the profile of the issue – right in the country’s heartland – and demonstrate broad opposition to a wider war. Several US cities have passed such resolutions, but Chicago would be by far the largest and most prominent to do so. A Chicago success could inspire activists in other cities to press their local governments to pass similar measures.

The goal is to influence policy by showing there would be serious political consequences to any attack. With an American leadership seemingly indifferent to (if not contemptuous of) its record-low approval ratings, activists are shifting their sights to representatives closer to home. Hopes are that pressure rising from below will curb the bellicose rhetoric and ominous manoeuvres of the Bush administration in the short run and thwart the impulse to seek security through wars of aggression in the longer run.

Will the local strategy work? An answer may begin to emerge on May 14. Stay tuned.

http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/michael_lynn/2008/05/thinking_globally_acting_locally.html

Dick Cheney has his sights set on Iran

To the Editor:

Dick Cheney is making the same type of broad accusation that he made in the run-up to the Iraq war. This time, his target is Iran: “Obviously, they’re also heavily involved in trying to develop nuclear weapons enrichment, the enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade levels,” he said during an interview in Turkey on Monday with ABC’s Martha Raddatz.

Cheney’s statement contradicts the findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency and his own intelligence agency’s reports. One can be sure that he is working behind the scenes, imploring the intelligence community to come up with some piece of information — no matter how small or suspect — that supports his contentions.

We’ve seen it all before.

From India eNews.com

By Ria Novosti. Moscow, Russia, 10:32 PM IST

Moscow, March 27 (RIA Novosti) Russian military intelligence services are reporting a flurry of activity by US Armed Forces near Iran’s borders, a high-ranking security source said Tuesday.

‘The latest military intelligence data point to heightened US military preparations for both an air and ground operation against Iran,’ the official said, adding that the Pentagon has probably not yet made a final decision as to when an attack will be launched.

He said the Pentagon is looking for a way to deliver a strike against Iran ‘that would enable the Americans to bring the country to its knees at minimal cost.’

He also said the US Naval presence in the Persian Gulf has for the first time in the past four years reached the level that existed shortly before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, vice president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences, said last week that the Pentagon is planning to deliver a massive air strike on Iran’s military infrastructure in the near future.

A new US carrier battle group has been dispatched to the Gulf.

The USS John C. Stennis, with a crew of 3,200 and around 80 fixed-wing aircraft, including F/A-18 Hornet and Super hornet fighter-bombers, eight support ships and four nuclear submarines are heading for the Gulf, where a similar group led by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower has been deployed since Dec 2006. The US is also sending Patriot anti-missile systems to the region.