Iran’s internal affairs: Keep the U.S. out

Submitted by Shervin Boloorian on July 22, 2009 on the FORpeaceBlog.

As Congress prepares to consider more Iran sanctions, it should also consider that confrontational U.S. policies have come nowhere close to changing Iran’s behavior in the last 30 years. On the other hand, in reaction to a contested election, the Iranians have formed an unprecedented home-grown movement for political expression through their own resources, their own desire for democratic progress, and their own sacrifices.

No coercive American government policy — be it threat of force or punitive sanctions or negative broadcast propaganda — is responsible for the wave of mass public protest that has taken Tehran by storm and split its political and religious establishments over the last month.

Even still, Democrat and Republican House and Senate members alike still believe (remarkably) that more U.S. sanctions or anti-government broadcasts will somehow help improve the situation. According to activists in Iran, so long as these programs are backed by the U.S. government, they stand to backfire and do more harm than good, and we should resist the urge to support them.

It’s true that the violence from the government crackdowns has been brutal and appalling but, as Stephen Kinzer noted in a recent article, the U.S. government simply lacks the moral authority to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs.

This harsh reality may anger some people, but it’s difficult to dispute that we have a poor track record when it comes to “imposing democracy” in Iran and the Middle East, and that an aggressive reaction to the Iranian government’s practices has historically proven dangerous.

Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi’s call for a United Nations human rights monitor to Iran is one option that seems to make sense. This would be a multilateral measure that should put pressure on the Iranian authorities while also placating those who say that the U.S. should do more to help Iran’s people. Of course, it will not placate everybody.

As historic as the current situation is inside Iran, it is also our best opportunity as Americans to do what we have seldom done with respect to Iran — and that is to pause and listen to the will of seasoned civic leaders working tirelessly within the current political system to develop change. Ebadi is a human rights leader and an established and respected name among Iranians as well as the international community. She understands what is needed and I trust that she knows better than certain Iranian exiles, who have not been to Iran in decades.

Iran is one of the founding members of the U.N. and wants to avoid further international fallout. By backing Ebadi’s call for an envoy and not pushing for more coercion, the Iranian government would be placed on the defensive and our message to the Iranian people would be clear — we want to help but we first accept that Iranians should be the masters of their own destiny; democracy in Iran should come from within; it is not and should not be the American government’s struggle. The American people stand in solidarity with your cause, and we accept that it is not our place to dictate the terms of democratic change.

Such gestures may also help reverse years of Iranian disdain and mistrust of America and its intentions in Iran. The Iranian people must believe that coerciveness is not the goal in Washington, and that people working intelligently within the establishment can be more nuanced in their approach to Iran. As an American of Iranian descent, I believe Iranians deserve to see that the American policy world can get it right and that America’s values, goals, and aspirations for peace and progress do not depend on Iran’s surrender.

As has been demonstrated in protests in Washington D.C. and elsewhere in the country, there are a growing number of Americans who genuinely care about the nonviolent struggle for change in Iran, and showing concern and unity of purpose is good. Still, the best bet for our government is to heed the advice of Iran’s civil society until we can redefine the wounded U.S.-Iran relationship through sorely needed trust-building. The belief that America can listen to Iranians within Iran, rather than add to a laundry list of demands and punitive actions, can help rescue this relationship.

Americans can further do their part by asking Congress not to continue the policies of overreaction and intimidation during this delicate time. Asking Congress to reconsider new sanctions legislation and ignore those who would see Iran’s present condition as a weakness to be exploited for self-interest is particularly essential.

Iranian protestors have gained fierce admiration for their courage. Shirin Ebadi and other activist leaders within Iran have been preparing their people for this moment for years. They deserve our attention now more than ever.

Shervin Boloorian is an Iranian American based in Washington DC. Mr. Boloorian just completed a two-year appointment as Washington representative of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists.  Prior to that position, he worked as a legislative coordinator for the National Iranian American Council.

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The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace

Policy Discussion held on June 25, 2009 in Washington D.C.

With demonstrations across Iran subsiding under a brutal security crackdown, and opposition leaders hoping to turn protests into strikes and other acts of civil disobedience, Carnegie hosted leading Iran experts Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Abbas Milani, and Karim Sadjadpour to discuss the aftermath of the election and its implications for U.S. foreign policy in the region.  David Ignatius moderated the discussion.

Worldwise:  Witnessing History in Iran

Gary Sick from Columbia University and founder of the Gulf/2000 Project and Afshin Molavi of the New America Foundation and author of “The Soul of Iran” discuss the divisions in the Iranian regime, the opposition movement, political Islam, and the challenges facing a US response.  Recorded June 19, 2009 and posted June 21, 2009 on Bloggingheads.tv.

Worldwise: Witnessing History in Iran
Deep divisions within the Iranian regime (09:37)
Moussavi, the “accidental leader” of the opposition (03:39)
Eroding legitimacy and expanding repression (06:10)
Obama’s huge challenge (06:57)
Afshin: What viewers can do (01:23)
Political Islam: It’s not easy being green (05:00)

Remember Iran, the greatest threat to Western civilization since, well, Iraq? The posturing conservatives who dominated America’s foreign policy for most of the last seven years pretended the only approach that ever could or should be pursued toward the mullahs would be isolation, confrontation and, what the hell, annihilation. Who can forget the oft-repeated campaign mantra of Sen. John McCain that the only thing worse than going to war with Iran would be a nuclear-armed Iran?

Well, it turns out that a lot of things are worse. It’s funny how a reassertive Russia armed with some 10,000 all-too-real nuclear weapons puts the theoretical menace of Iran’s as yet non- existent arsenal in perspective. But, looking ahead, what’s more curious still is that a new administration–maybe even McCain’s–may start looking for ways to work with Iran to help balance Russian power.

For centuries, whenever Russia has thrashed around in the Caucasus or in Central Asia, the Persians have been among the first to feel the bear’s hot breath. The kingdoms of Georgia, one may recall, were vassals of the shahs before they were taken by the tsars in the early 19th century. Imperial Russia kept pushing decade after decade until its troops occupied even the Iranian city of Tabriz. In the 20th century, the Soviets repeatedly tried to establish variations on the theme of a Persian Socialist Republic. That’s the kind of history the millennially minded Iranians keep in mind.

It’s true that over the last 20 years, Tehran’s relations with Moscow have been much more cooperative. The Persian pariahs would take any friends they could get. But those were the decades when Russia’s sphere of influence was shrinking–and the Russian move into Georgia is a clear signal those days of timidity are over.

History, especially Caucasian, Caspian and Central Asian history has restarted with a vengeance. The dynamics of confrontation and conciliation in Iran’s neighborhood are now every bit as complicated as they were in the 19th century, when an expanding Russian empire came up against the intrigues, alliances and sometimes overt military actions of imperial Britain in the rivalry that became known as “The Great Game.” What’s needed as we start reshaping American policy to fit the new circumstances is a reality check or, perhaps better said, a realpolitik check.

Over the short run, the mullahs will reap several benefits from Russia’s play in Georgia and Western reaction to it. “If you are no longer the greatest threat du jour then you are off the hook,” says Vali Nasr, an Iran scholar affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations. Given the diplomatic standoff between Moscow and Washington, it will be much harder to enforce U.N. Security Council sanctions leveled against Iran for pursuing its nuclear-enrichment program. Further tightening the screws will be all but impossible. At the same time, the likelihood of American-led or supported military action against Iran is also diminished. It was never a good idea, and now it would be a very dangerous distraction for the already depleted U.S. military. Israel, however worried it may be, will have to understand that.

If Iran is not already working at full speed to develop nuclear weapons (it insists its intentions are entirely peaceful), it could be expected to pick up the pace now, and not least as a deterrent to Russian expansion in its direction. On the other hand, if it pushes too hard and too fast, Moscow may start to see nuclear-armed mullahs as a dangerous distraction, and Tehran would have to take into account the possibility that Russia, in its new and aggressive posture, would act directly and ruthlessly to eliminate the threat. Under current circumstances, who would come to Iran’s defense? Even if the Iranians decide to slow down their nuclear program, or stop it, they will have to worry about Moscow’s long-term designs on oil and natural-gas deposits around the Caspian Sea, where Russia already has a fleet and already disputes Iran’s claims to a large portion of the resources beneath the water.

The incoming American administration could “play on those kinds of fears and take advantage of the opportunities,” says Nasr. “But to play that kind of game you need a lot of clarity of vision.” That hasn’t really been the hallmark of the Bush administration, nor of McCain’s rhetoric, nor of Barack Obama’s talk about talking. Indeed, the basic policy framework of the United States is built on fundamental contradictions. “We talk as if Iran is the biggest threat, but we act as if Russia is,” says Nasr.

Thus Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed a deal with Warsaw on Tuesday to put part of the American ballistic-missile shield in Poland, having long asserted that the purpose was to thwart Iran. But, um, Iran has no intercontinental ballistic missiles. Its attempt to launch a rocket into space over the weekend appears to have quite literally fizzled. Moscow, meanwhile, has hundreds of perfectly serviceable ICBMs. (We sometimes send our own American astronauts to the International Space Station on Russia’s reliable rockets.) It’s hardly surprising the Russians think the purpose of the American missile shield is to eliminate what’s left of the old strategic balance and give Washington a potential first-strike capability against Moscow. That sort of confrontation, if overplayed, could slip toward the Strangelovian standoffs of the cold war or, conceivably, something worse.

In fact, the new Great Game, like the old one, will be a long narrative of intrigue and confrontation in which there is no sudden or decisive resolution. Realism will dictate efforts to improve relations with states on Russia’s periphery whether or not their ideologies are compatible with American democratic ideals. Another Iran scholar, Gary Sick at Columbia University, believes the policymakers remaining in the Bush administration have actually come to understand this, albeit very late. “After 9/11 their world view was that the United States had limitless power,” says Sick. “I don’t think they believe that anymore. And if you really believe you have to husband your power in ways that are more cost effective, you have to change our approach to Iran.” It won’t be easy. The Iranians are hard bargainers with regional ambitions of their own, but they are not irrational, and their primary interest is security. Oddly enough, Washington may find that the U.S. benefits by helping them feel safer, not more threatened.

Read original article here: www.newsweek.com/id/154523

*When you call, ask for the aide who handles international affairs or foreign policy. Tell them you’re calling to encourage the Senator or Representative to: (1) Work for direct, unconditional, and comprehensive talks between the U.S. and Iran; (2) Remind them that the U.S. and Iran share common interests in a stable Iraq, Middle East and Afghanistan. (3) And emphasize that just as the U.S. pursued negotiations with North Korea and Libya it’s now time to talk with Iran.

Capitol Switchboard at (202)224-3121 (Also, this toll free number is mentioned in publicity for the event: 800- 788-9372).